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that the "Winds" message was even real. Because of the discrepancies in testimony given about the "Winds" message, the inquiry (31) was unable to determine if such a message was ever really received.

The most important message intercepted was a fourteen part message. When this series of messages were decrypted it was obvious that the Japanese were completely dissatisfied with the American-Japanese relations. That message was the Japanese reply to the latest American proposal that had been set forth during diplomatic negotiations, which were aimed at peacefully halting Japanese aggression in the Pacific. Tokyo sent the messages to its diplomats in Washington, asking them to keep information secret for the time being. As soon as Roosevelt read the first 13 parts he said to his adviser, Harry Hopkins, "This Means War" (32). That night the 13 parts of the vital Japanese message were delivered not only to Roosevelt but also to Admiral Wilkinson (33), both were slow to take action (34).

The fourteenth part of the messages would be the conclusion of what Japanese planned to do. This last part of the Japanese message was "It is impossible to reach agreement through further negotiations (35). Col. C.C. Dunsenbury (36) had received all fourteen parts of the Japanese diplomatic message at midnight December 6, 1941 (37). He did not immediately deliver these decrypts to General Marshall because he did not understand their importance and did not wish to disturb him at that late hour. He waited until morning before passing the message on to Marshall. His actions lost nine vital hours that could have been used to warn Pearl Harbor (38). Even if only Kimmel or Short (39) had been informed of the contents of the fourteen part message American losses could have been reduced (40).

The real blame for Pearl Harbor cannot be placed upon any one individual or a single event. Several people are to blame for the surprise attack on December 7, 1941. There was no single scapegoat, from Roosevelt on down they all made mistakes.

The investigations, specifically the Congressional investigation, held that the Army and Navy were responsible for the attack, that officers in both Hawaii and Washington were informed of the possibility of an air attack.

Roosevelt selected Admiral Husband Kimmel over the heads of men who outranked him and promoted him to the temporary rank of full Admiral. This made him one of the few four-star Admirals in the Navy. Kimmel was known for his ability to get the best out of his subordinates (41). Kimmel's major contribution to the attack was withholding vital information. Kimmel was an arrogant man who believed that he was the perfect man to handle any difficulties that might arise on Pearl. He was unwilling to share vital information with even his own command, information that he felt he had worked hard to acquire and was his to do with as he pleased. He withheld that Washington had sent him a war warning message when the Japanese started destroying their codes and code machines. It was Kimmel's job to take care of long range reconnaissance for Oahu, while it was Lieutenant General Walter C. Short's responsibility to protect Oahu against enemy air and sea attack (42).

Lt. Gen. Short is also to blame for the attack on Pearl. As commanding General of Hawaii he made several failures. Like Kimmel, he refused to share information. He did not alert his forces to the possibility of a surprise Japanese attack, and did not follow a Washington order to conduct reconnaissance before the attack. As the commander of Hawaiian forces he never determined the Navy's state of readiness before the attack (43).

The committee (44) reached seven conclusions about Short and

Kimmel's failures.

(1) Failure to discharge their responsibility in light of warnings received from Washington or from other information they possessed, and in light of the principle of command by mutual cooperation

(2) Failure to integrate and coordinate their facilities for defense.

(3) Failure to communicate with each other and to exchange fully all intelligence.

(4) Failure to maintain effective reconnaissance (which included the failure to use radar)

(5) Failure to establish a state of readiness in the Army and Navy capable of meeting all possible attacks

(6) Failure to employ the facilities in their possession to properly repel a Japanese attack.

(7) Failure to appreciate the significance of intelligence and other information available to them.

Even the Chief of Staff, General Marshall was accused of dereliction of duty. The investigations at the end of the war charged Marshall with a failure to keep Short fully informed as to the international situation and the probable outbreak of war, and to note Short's message that he was only preparing for sabotage without taking any action. He was also charged with a failure to alert Short on the evening of December 6 that an almost certain break with Japanese was coming. His greatest failure was not investigating and determining the state of readiness of Short's command during an impending threat of war with Japan (45).

Lieutenant Colonel Kendall J. Fielder was assigned to the Hawaiian department of Army Intelligence. His only crime was being unqualified for the position to which he was assigned. More concerned with social functions than Hawaiian military concerns he shunned responsibilities and failed to find out what was really going on with Pearl Harbor Army and Navy commands (46).

Had they been good observers, these men might have noticed that in January and February of 1941 Japanese businesses were withdrawing money rather than depositing finances (47).

Even the War Department were faulted by the nine different investigations (48) for failure to provide information to Kimmel and Short. Had the Navy Department provided Kimmel with a look at MAGIC and the messages from the Honolulu consulate revealing its reports on US warships in harbor, Knox and Stimson could have arranged for Kimmel and Short to return to the capital for important briefings (49). Kimmel did not have a "Purple" decryption machine which could have enabled his intelligence officers to read the series of disturbing messages being exchanged between Tokyo and Washington. Finally the war department was faulted for not alerting Short and Kimmel to prepare an adequate alert, and for not keeping them informed about the on going diplomatic negotiations between Japan and America (50).

Roosevelt's only crime was that he failed to take prompt effective action. He was guilty of negligence. After reading the thirteen parts of the fourteen part diplomatic message around midnight on December 6, 1941, he then elected to put everything on hold until a meeting could be convened. The next morning at ten, that meeting never came (51). He should have called General Marshall that night, as Marshall would have alerted Kimmel to a possible attack. He failed to take prompt and effective action to bring his subordinates together to achieve a decision about what should be done (52). Roosevelt loved the Navy, he would never have allowed his precious ships and men to be sent to the bottom. That was not his character